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Abstract
We document cyclical fluctuations in scheduled payments of newly issued sovereign debt. During
recessions, scheduled payments become more back-loaded. Our results provide direct evidence on a
key parameter governing the functional form of cash flows in the long-term debt literature.
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1 Introduction
Recent research has extended the study of the stock of debt to questions related to its maturity
structure, the relative size and timing of payments, for example Rodrik and Velasco (1999), Arellano
and Ramanarayanan (2012), Asonuma, Niepelt, and Ranciere (2017). Commonly used measures,
like maturity and Macaulay duration, capture only in part the dynamics of payment schedules.
Substantially different cash flows, in terms of coupon structure, maturity dates, etc., can exhibit the
same duration. In particular, we argue that the cash flow implied by new issuance conveys additional
information, hitherto unexploited by standard debt statistics. To address this limitation in existing
work, we introduce a parsimonious measure, the average growth rate of scheduled payments, to
capture the degree of back-loading of the repayment schedule: the timing and relative size of coupon
and principal payments. A higher growth rate of payments induces a more back-loaded schedule,
which can greatly help a borrowing country smooth consumption during downturns, since the bulk
of obligations will be paid in the future, when the economy is expected to eventually recover.
Using Bloomberg bond data for eleven emerging economies, we investigate the cyclical fluctua-
tions in the scheduled payments of newly issued bonds. Our findings are twofold. First, the growth
rate of scheduled payments is higher when spreads are higher. Given that spreads are strongly
countercyclical, this implies that scheduled payments are more back-loaded during downturns. Sec-
ond, the maturity of newly issued bonds is shorter during such periods, confirming the results of
Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) and Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2013). Moreover, our
findings about the behavior of payment growth, the main contribution of this paper, are robust to
controlling for the maturity. That is, maturity is one of, but not the sole determinant of the growth
rate of payments and the shape of the schedule more broadly.
Our results provide direct evidence on a key parameter governing the shape of cash flows in
the widely used decaying perpetuity bond structure: Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), Arellano and
Ramanarayanan (2012), and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) are only a few of the many recent
papers using this functional form restriction, in the quantitative long-term debt literature. This
parameter, governing the slope of the schedule, is usually calibrated to match a long-run average
measure of duration. We find that its direct data counterpart exhibits substantial and systematic
cyclical variation. In this context, our findings are salient to questions related to optimal maturity,
debt dilution, and related quantitative-theoretic issues.
2 Method
We characterize sovereign debt issuance using three measures: maturity (T ), Macaulay duration
(D), and the growth rate of payments (δ). Consider a sovereign country i in period t, where time
periods t are weeks. That is, we consider weekly issuance as our benchmark, following Broner,
Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2013). Let cit(s) denote the cash flow—in real U.S. Dollar terms—
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promised by the portfolio issued at period t to be paid s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N it} periods later. N it refers
to the number of periods until the last payment is scheduled. Let n be the number of periods
in a year. The benchmark payment frequency is set to one quarter; we set n = 4, and s counts
over the quarters in the lifespan of the bonds. We consider an alternative case, yearly aggregation
with n = 1; results for this specification are qualitatively similar to the benchmark results (See the
Online Appendix).
Whenever multiple bonds are issued within a given week, we sum over the cross-section of
promised cash flows, within each future period, resulting in a single stream of payments cit(s), as
if the country had issued a single instrument making all the payments scheduled by the actual
bonds issued. Such constructed streams are assigned a maturity T it (in years) given by the average
maturity of the actually issued bonds, weighted by each bond’s real principal value. We label the
promised cash-flow profile
{
cit(s)
}Nt
s=1 as “payment schedule.” To compute the annualized growth
rate of payment δit, we regress the promised cash flows on the number of years elapsed since the
issuance date t,
log cit(s) = constant + δit
s
n
+ it(s) (1)
where it(s) is an error term reflecting deviations of the actual schedule from a constant growth rate
stream. Table 1 reports country-level, average R-squared statistics for these regressions.
Duration Dit measures the average length of time to payment, weighted by each payment. It is
given by
Dit =
N it∑
s=1
cit(s)R−s/n∑N it
s=1{cit(s)R−s/n}
s
n
, (2)
where R denotes the gross annual, real, risk-free rate, which we fix at 3.2 percent, following Arellano
and Ramanarayanan (2012). In doing so, we separate movements in quantities (the cash flow)
from changes in prices (time-varying discounting). Thus, Dit represents the risk-free version of the
Macaulay duration, widely studied in the literature.
Our proposed measure δ is designed to capture in a parsimonious way rich heterogeneity of bond
characteristics in the data: several bonds are sometimes issued within a week, each with different
frequency of payments, coupon rates—fixed or variable—, currency and maturity. All other things
constant, a longer maturity, higher coupon rates, or a higher frequency of payments will tend to
“flatten” the payment schedule and reduce the absolute value of δ. In our analysis we document
the joint behavior of maturity (T ) and the growth rate of scheduled payments (δ). This can recover
additional information, relative to Macaulay duration, which conflates both margins and potentially
obscures their distinct dynamics.
3
3 Data
We study the same set of eleven emerging market sovereigns as Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler
(2013). Using the Bloomberg Professional database, we extract information on external debt and
construct promised cash flows. In the data, contracts are fairly diverse, employing several coupon
types (e.g. fixed rate, zero coupon, step, variable, float), with varying coupon payment frequencies
(e.g. annual and semi-annual). Since we focus on issuance, we must address the fact that countries
sometimes issue several bonds within the same time period, each with its own rich characteristics,
an inherently high-dimensional object. In order to facilitate aggregation of cash flows, both across
bonds and over time, we introduce a new statistic: the growth rate of scheduled payments, which
captures in a parsimonious way the dynamics of scheduled payments over the lifetime of the bond.
We focus on foreign-currency denominated bonds and exclude bonds either with special features
(e.g., collateralized) or with guarantees from international financial institutions, e.g. IMF or World
Bank, and foreign governments/banks.1 Finally, we exclude zero-coupon bonds2 but document the
robustness of our findings to this assumption in the Online Appendix.
Since countries issue debt denominated in several currencies, we convert flows to real U.S. Dollars
using nominal exchange rates (provided by IMF) and the U.S. CPI series (from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics). We assume that, for a given bond, the exchange rate at the issuance date is used for
all future payments3 (i.e., martingale process), while the ex-post U.S. CPI is used as a deflator
(i.e., perfect foresight). Realized LIBOR rates from EconStats.com are used (i.e., perfect foresight)
whenever a bond specifies its coupon rate relative to such a reference rate.
We document key facts about the bond-level issuance data, in relation to the spread series,
based on yield curve estimates. These spreads are measured by the differences in the (annualized)
yield-to-maturity relative to equivalent U.S. (or German) bonds. We consider spreads for bonds of
different maturities: The “three-year” spread is for bonds of maturities up to three years, “nine-
year” spread reflects those between six and nine years, and “twelve-year” spread represents all bonds
with maturities over nine years. All spreads are weekly series provided by Broner, Lorenzoni, and
Schmukler (2013). These are natural choice for a cyclical indicator given the relatively high time
frequency of the analysis.
4 Results
Table 1 reports the summary statistics. The mean payment growth rate is 19 percent, while the
average maturity is about nine years, and the average duration is about seven years. All countries
1See related discussion in Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2013).
2Most countries, except for Argentina, Turkey, and Uruguay, did not issue such bonds. In our sample, 40% of
Argentina’s bonds are zero-coupon, 84% for Uruguay and 12% for Turkey.
3This assumption eliminates potentially spurious movements in debt statistics due to ex-post exchange rates
dynamics.
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issue back-loaded bonds, with positive payment growth, ranging from 11 percent to around 37
percent. We are interested in how emerging markets vary issuance characteristics with the business
cycle, as reflected in the 6-to-9 year interest rate spread, labeled “9-year spread.” Table 2 provides
correlation coefficients of bond characteristics with such a spread. For all countries except Russia,
the maturity is negatively correlated with the spread. Payment schedules are more back-loaded
when the interest rate is higher, as reflected in their positive correlation for most countries.
4.1 Main Results
We investigate the systemic relationship between payment schedule and spreads. We run panel
regressions of maturity, duration, and payment growth, respectively, employing the specification
introduced by Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2013). The main covariate of interest is the
spread and we control for the real exchange rate, terms of trade, and an investment-grade dummy
(indicating whether the sovereign bond is rated as investment-grade by credit rating agencies).
More specifically, all dependent and explanatory variables are six-month moving averages (using a
26-week rolling window) and demeaned for each country. All explanatory variables are in logs.
The OLS estimates are liable to be biased due either to unobserved country credit quality
affecting both the spread and issuance characteristics (i.e., an omitted variable problem) or to the
fact that the choice of bond characteristics might impact the spread itself (i.e., a reverse causality
problem). As such, we use an instrumental variable (IV) strategy, where we consider two instruments
for the spread: first, the US high-yield corporate bond index as in Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler
(2013), and second, the spread of Moody’s Aaa-rated corporate bonds index. Both of these reflect
the risk appetite of investors in the global bond markets and hence likely to be unaffected by the
bond supply behavior of countries in our sample. These sovereign debt “demand shifters” allow us
to identify supply behavior over debt characteristics.
Table 3 presents our panel regression results4, where standard errors are robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and serial correlation (Bartlett kernel with bandwidth of 5, i.e., 4-week lag). Financial condi-
tions are a statistically significant determinants of issuance choice, with a negative coefficient in the
regressions of maturity and positive in those for payment growth. Patterns for duration are similar
to those for maturity.
Our findings about the cyclical behavior of the growth rate of payments is robust to controlling
for maturity: Table 4 reports this case. It shows that maturity is one, but not the sole determinant
of the growth rate of scheduled payments.
Our analysis highlights two main results. First, the maturity of bonds shortens during periods
of financial distress, consistent with findings in previous work. To the best of own knowledge, our
second finding is new to the literature: sovereigns also adjust payment schedules in response to
4See Table 2 in the Online Appendix for the results for the first-stage regression of the spread on instrumental
variables and other control variables.
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Table 2: Cyclical Behavior of Bond Characteristics
Corr. with Maturity Duration Pmt. Growth (δ)
Spread (T ) (D) Quarterly Yearly
Argentina -0.31 -0.30 0.10 0.08
Brazil -0.48 -0.55 0.52 0.45
Colombia -0.45 -0.52 0.42 0.39
Hungary -0.35 -0.37 0.17 0.19
Mexico -0.23 -0.30 0.23 0.23
Poland -0.28 -0.34 0.30 0.32
Russia 0.32 0.25 -0.14 -0.01
South Africa -0.06 -0.12 0.22 0.22
Turkey -0.18 -0.21 0.00 -0.07
Uruguay -0.50 -0.54 0.44 0.65
Venezuela -0.12 -0.18 0.20 0.16
Average -0.24 -0.29 0.22 0.24
Note: this table provides correlation coefficients of variables with the
spread. Spread (r) is the annual percentage (nine-year maturity) inter-
est rate spread. “Quarterly” refers to quarterly aggregation of payment
and and “Yearly” refers to yearly aggregation of payment.
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8
financial distress, by issuing more back-loaded bonds. This has potentially important implications
for risk-sharing during downturns and quantitative analyses of long-term debt and maturity choice.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we consider a richer description of debt issuance characteristics than previously dis-
cussed in the literature, with an emphasis on a measure of back-loading, the growth rate of scheduled
payments. In studying the cyclical behavior of this measure, we go beyond the characterization of
debt in terms of Macaulay duration and instead consider two complementary measures: payment
growth rate and maturity. Using Bloomberg data on the 11 emerging market economies’ bond is-
suance, we find that during recessions and periods of financial distress, countries issue bonds with
more back-loaded payments and shorter maturity. Moreover, the observed back-loading is sizable,
even conditioning on maturity. Our findings about the countercyclical growth rate of scheduled
payments have important implications for risk-sharing during downturns and for the quantitative-
theoretic work on long-term debt.
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gr
es
so
rs
,i
.e
.,
sp
re
ad
an
d
m
at
ur
ity
,w
e
us
e
th
e
tw
o
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
:
U
S
hi
gh
-y
ie
ld
co
rp
or
at
e
bo
nd
in
de
x
(H
Y
)a
nd
th
e
M
oo
dy
’s
A
aa
ra
te
d
co
rp
or
at
e
bo
nd
sp
re
ad
re
la
tiv
e
to
th
e
10
-y
ea
rF
ed
ra
te
(A
aa
).
In
th
e
fir
st
-s
ta
ge
re
gr
es
sio
n,
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
is
60
14
fo
r
sp
re
ad
s
an
d
44
08
fo
r
m
at
ur
ity
.
A
ll
va
ria
bl
es
ar
e
6-
m
on
th
m
ov
in
g
av
er
ag
es
an
d
de
m
ea
ne
d
fo
r
ea
ch
co
un
tr
y.
C
on
tr
ol
va
ria
bl
es
ar
e
in
lo
gs
.
Sp
re
ad
s
ar
e
in
lo
g-
sp
re
ad
s
lo
g
(1
+
r)
,a
nd
m
ul
tip
lie
d
by
on
e
hu
nd
re
d;
m
at
ur
ity
is
in
ye
ar
s.
3-
y
Sp
re
ad
is
fo
r
th
e
bo
nd
w
ith
th
e
m
at
ur
ity
up
to
th
re
e
ye
ar
s,
9-
y
Sp
re
ad
th
e
m
at
ur
ity
be
tw
ee
n
six
-
an
d
ni
ne
-y
ea
rs
,a
nd
12
-y
Sp
re
ad
th
e
m
at
ur
ity
gr
ea
te
r
th
an
ni
ne
ye
ar
s.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
ro
bu
st
to
he
te
ro
sk
ed
as
tic
ity
an
d
w
ith
in
co
un
tr
y
se
ria
lc
or
re
la
tio
n.
**
sig
ni
fic
an
t
at
5%
;*
**
at
1%
.
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